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This paper is about politics in Western Uganda and the multiple 
ways it relates to organizations of activists1  working on human 
rights issues2. It draws examples from a local organization3 
dealing with illegal expropriations of land in the region. As land 
grabbing is pervading in Ugandan society, land rights defenders 
deal with actors from a large sociological spectrum, from poor 
farmers to top-level politicians. Advocating human rights against 
land grabbing entices exposure and risks. 
I aim to demonstrate that the conditions for activism on land 
grabbing in a context cast as “hybrid authoritarian4” (Tripp, 
2010) imply specific measures and strategies designed to master 
constraints. On the long run – as will be shown –, shielding 
against these constraints is shaping activist organizations into 
public-sector-like “institutions”. Organisations are therefore 
found at the intersection of the public and the private, or the profit 
and non-profit sectors. Paradoxically, the threat that organisations 
actually face is minimal, but it constitutes, nevertheless, the 
foundation of their credibility and legitimacy as “community-
based organizations” in the eyes of Western donors, and a key 
narrative for their communication.
International academic studies of the non-profit and the NGO 
sectors in Uganda mostly underline the discrepancy between 
objectives and achievements – or absence of achievements (Ssonko 
Nabacwa, 2010). A common explanation is the “hidden agendas” 
of the milieu, that is, mostly their greed for money and power 
(Dicklitch & Lwanga, 2003). According to the aforementioned 
authors, this would explain why the field of human rights poorly 
contests the most contentious topics and their politicization. In 
this paper, my approach differs from dominant views of the human 
rights sector. Following Marie-Emmanuelle Pommerolle’s work 
on human rights NGOs in Kenya and Cameroon (Pommerolle, 
2005), it focuses on the historical and sociological genesis of local 
organizations. Such an approach helps understand how they are 
shaped through contingencies and strategies; it sheds light on the 
way in which processes of accumulation of both local/national/
international influence and financial means enable autonomy and 
margins of action on opposing topics. In other words, it shows 
the way in which organisations become “institutions” similar to 
public-sector institutions.
Mastering the everyday risk: how a repressed group became 
a local “institution”
Recent significant Acts – namely the NGO Registration Act (2006) 
and the NGO Act (2016) – hardened the Ugandan legislation on 
NGOs. Field specialists feared a potential muzzling of the voices 
of human rights defenders. I will explain how the organizations 
under study – and more broadly the milieu of human rights NGOs 
(HRNGO) – reacted to this new legislative framework. I look at 
the Kabarole district of Western Uganda and how its geographic 
remoteness from the central government allowed organisations to 
develop specific strategies and be more vocal. 
My case-study organisation was founded in 2006 by a group of 
activists who were already airing on local radios (Better FM, Life 
FM, etc.). In the broadcasts, they were denouncing corruption and 
asking the ruling elite to abide by accountability practices. Their 
shows had a social resonance: radio is the most important and 
broadly used media in the country (Brisset-Foucault, 2011). As 
a consequence, the very straightforward and polemical language 
used by these activists5 highly exposed them to retaliation. 
Following regular repressive acts, like beatings, threats, etc., 
they gathered and created an informal association that became a 
registered structure in 2007. However, at the time, the association 
was not registered as an NGO but as a “Company limited with 
guarantee without shared capital6” – a non-profit type of company 
– so as to avoid falling under a NGO Registration Act and 
consequently avoid seeing their licence withdrawn from them in 
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Introduction 
In Tanzania, the struggle for space and resources 
is embedded in a long history of accumulation by 
dispossession, shaped by a large web of multi-scalar 
powers of exclusion. Tanzania is considered a country 
rich in natural resources, with considerable ‘idle’ 
and ‘unexploited’ lands by international and national 
institutions. The former concepts are taken up locally 
by those who help implement estates, and rhetorically in 
advocacy discourses during negotiations. In the Kilombero 
district, more than 80% of the land that covers the Kilombero 
valley and the surrounding mountains are already 
enclosed for environment conservation, mining extraction, 
hydro-power plants or large-scale plantations purposes. 
Nevertheless, the SAGCOT (Southern Agricultural 
Growth Corridor) program identified 182,198 ha (28% of 
the village lands) “that could be offered for investment” 
(SAGCOT, 2012b: 12). On top of that, a complex and 
institutionalized land demarcation and valuation process is 
being undertaken: from the introduction of the Certificate 
of Customary Rights of Occupancy in 2004, the Land Use 
Planning Act No. 6 of 2007 which “provides procedures 
related to the preparation of village land use planning in 
a sustainable and participatory manner” (ibid, 2013: 126), 
the Tanzania-G8 Land Transparency Partnership (TLTP) 
in 2013, to the Land Tenure Support Program (LTSP) 
launched in partnership with the Denmark’s development 
cooperation (DANIDA), the British Department for 
International Development (DFID) and the Swedish 
International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA) 
in 2016, several huge and heavily-financed programs aim 
at formalizing land rights and clarifying village borders 
and plans. In this paper, I will focus on the Ruipa Site, 
one particular area of the valley which is highly coveted 
and is one of the latest “interstices” of environmental 
conservation. While the establishment of a RAMSAR site1 
denies access to the wetlands on the east, and the expansion 
of the Kilombero Nature Reserve (KNR) restricts access to 
the forest on the west, the central and district governments 
plan to revive a sugar cane plantation project of 10,000 ha 
that is highly contested by local inhabitants. During the 
negotiations for land enclosures, different powers play in 
the struggle for space and resources. I will first show how 
the Village Land Use Plans (VLUPs) are used as one of the 
powerful tools by District and Village leaders to impose 
their planning objectives. Then I will underline that this 
plan, anchored in the Local Government Act and the 
Village Land Act of 1982 and 1999 respectively, highlights 
the necessity to think about the definition of a “village” and 
its legal recognition in the “global land rush” in Tanzania2.
A revival based on an historical map
In 1976, in the same way, the Nyerere government 
established the Mngeta farm on 5,848 ha (60 km south-west 
of the valley) in cooperation with the Korean government; 
the Sugar Development Corporation (SUDECO3) with the 
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case they were accused of being “subversive”. This was far from 
being an uncalculated move: the founding members and directors 
of the institution are lawyers or experts in the development sector. 
While they first gained popularity through their broadcasts, they 
stopped going on air and progressively switched to legal advice, 
then legal representation and assistance to the poor. Until today, 
the founders and top-management of the organization are members 
of a local elite, occupying various top-positions in the district. 
Most are young men in their thirties, all of them graduated from 
Kampala University in social sciences or law. Most of them have 
known each other since their childhood and are well connected 
to an earlier generation of activists7. Additionally, some “elders” 
are engaged along their side as volunteers, notably former “bush 
soldiers” from Museveni’s army8, bringing in an unrivalled 
knowledge of the field and the people from the region: they 
had “freed” the region from Obote’s regime in the 1980s. One 
of them is a former Intelligence Officer, another one is a former 
Lieutenant, and both left the National Revolutionary Army (NRA) 
in the 1990s because of their disappointment about Museveni’s 
conduct of public affairs. 
On the other hand, as the NGO grew bigger and received 
funds from Western countries donors (National Endowment 
for Democracy, KIOS Foundation, HIVOS, etc.), it had to 
fire members “infiltrated” by the ruling party, the National 
Resistance Movement (NRM). These “double-agents” tried to 
collect information and compromise the group by underlining its 
political motives, knowing that being explicitly “political” could 
lead to being designated as subversive and face hard repression. 
Conscious of these risks, the group of activists evolved from an 
organization with individual members structured as an association 
(internal democracy, collegial vote, etc.) to a hierarchized 
institution with important capital and human means.
In fact, a key condition to this “building-up” success, for such 
“community-based organizations” (CBOs), is the extension of 
local relays. In our case, most of them are low-level political 
actors (LC1)9 from villages, farmers themselves and farmers’ 
representatives. These local relays are attracted by the NGO 
through workshops or, mostly, through advertisements on local 
radios. They ensure the organization with a permanent and 
trustworthy network of informants and intelligence, implying 
lowered difficulties and costs in intelligence collection and access 
to local communities. Both are essential material for donor-funded 
organizations that need to account for their work with the rural 
people. Mostly poor and uneducated, the relays are the common 
targets for police arrests and private security hired by corporations, 
or even rich individuals, engaging in illegal expropriation. Given 
their importance and their exposure, the activists’ organization 
has to provide for and monitor the relays security. Thus, top-level 
activists are using their relations for freeing them from the police 
or prevent beatings, becoming more of a shield than a threatened 
group themselves. As mentioned above, the executive personnel 
of the organizations have international profiles, which holds a 
strong protection. Furthermore, they have an exact knowledge of 
what they can do, what they are able to say, and their margins of 
action. The CBOs negotiate and solve potential risks daily, so that 
stories of violence used in their communications are experimented 
only by their local network. Nowadays, the only repression 
the organization may face is ritualised and genuine. Arrested 
executive personnel are freed in a matter of hours. Most of them 
know or befriend the policeman who arrest them, they socialize in 
bars at night, making threats more virtual than concrete.
Local networking is combined with networking at larger scales 
with regional and national level NGO networks specialized 
in inter-linking organizations, as the Development Network 
of Indigenous Voluntary Association (DENIVA10). They are 
connecting CBOs to ensure a collective protection against 
repression, while engaging in a rhetoric of compliance with the 
state and referring to legal conformity. DENIVA for instance 
implemented a certificate of quality for Ugandan NGOs, called 
the Quality Assurance Mechanism (QUAM), as a reaction to the 
Registration Act. “Diplomas” of that kind are aiming to claim a 
NGO’s conformity with the Ugandan legislation. It is supposed to 
show the state authorities that all certified NGOs are not involved 
in “subversive” acts, even though it is equally an argument for 
attracting international funds (Fafchamps & Owens, 2009). 
Quite normative in its ambitions, and highly representative of 
the progression of an evaluation business in the non-profit sector, 
such a program illustrates the overlapping of scales that NGOs are 
commonly playing on. Strategies of that kind offer cumulative and 
differentiated resources in terms of protection and opportunities; 
resources dragged from that level are then reinvested in the local 
field. One needs to understand the porosity between the non-
profit world and the world of politics to get a better grasp at the 
modalities of the reinvestment.
Ambiguous relationships towards regional political actors 
and notability effects
Obviously, networking practices and the institutionalization 
of a non-profit organization do not occur outside the realm 
of public administration and the political field. Even if local 
activists managed to build extensive networks of interconnected 
actors inside the local political elite, it results more from logics 
of individual political engagement rather than from an overly 
conscious strategy. Far from being a rival or a co-optation organ, 
the world of non-profit organizations is even a privileged sector to 
reach political positions. In that regard, there is a fluidity of careers 
between political and non-profit staff. We have already mentioned 
the young local elite advocating on air: from the path of activism, 
some invested in different careers, from politics to human rights. 
Some used the reputation and notoriety earned with the local 
population through their activism, or their public proximity 
with activists, to get into various political positions that would 
otherwise be difficult to reach at such an early age. The local head 
of the main opposition party, the Forum for Democratic Change 
7 For instance, cultural associations with political discourse on the kingdom or radio broadcasters.
8 Museveni accessed presidency when overthrowing Milton Obote in 1986 after 5 years of guerrilla war (1981-1986).
9  In Uganda the decentralized administrative system is made of 5 gradual echelons (LC1 to LC5): village, parrish, sub-county, county/town, district 
(Kakumba, 2010).
10  DENIVA is a Ugandan organization with offices in Kampala and an extended network of partners’ country-wide.
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(FDC), and the speaker of the municipal council for instance, both 
originates from the group of activists I worked with.
A fusing of personal interests and reciprocal values, these 
professional politicians share information and confidential 
documents with the activists. For instance, they divulge cases of 
corruption from their political adversaries, which the organization 
is using in both its reports and press conferences, increasing its 
notoriety. Provision of information by political actors manifests 
the intense rivalries inside the ruling party (Wilkins, 2017), 
the NRM, especially the importance of its dissident wing in 
Kabarole. In an ambiguous manner, a branch of these young 
reformists makes use of the stamp of “activist” to gain influence 
in Museveni’s party using popular support, and of an established 
network of low-key dissidents within the NRM.
But the top-management of non-profit organizations is not shy 
when interacting with the political class: human rights defender 
careers may be quite attractive and rewarding. Non-profit elite’s 
earnings may be higher than the official salary of top-level local 
politicians – an exception being Members of Parliament – and 
becomes exponential if they are implicated in numerous programs, 
considering that they get compensation for each program they are 
involved with. The status of human rights defender also offers 
a privileged access to the international level – a significant 
indicator of success in local eyes. Thus, top non-profit managers 
are becoming public figures (Siméant, 2014), which goes together 
with considerable leeway in their actions.
In other words, high fluidity between non-profit and political 
networks, and autonomy, helps understand how those who manage 
to make a career are truly becoming notables in the region. The 
academic debates over the hidden agendas of NGOs and on co-
optation are far less relevant as soon as we understand that the 
development of an influent structure implies notability effects in 
itself.
An insight on the political agenda of non-profit organizations: 
the overthrowing attempt of the Tooro King in 2015
Community based organisations as these are picking the interests 
of donors looking for durable partners with whom they can 
spend their operational budget. When looking for partners to 
implement new programs, they prioritize them and have a link of 
reciprocal dependence. Fidelity of that sort provides the “elected” 
organization with a regular income that may be spent with relative 
care. In fact, it allows activists to directly invest in the political 
field in a dubious manner. Here, we examine the role the young 
activist elite played in the local power fight during a specific 
event: the overthrowing attempt of the Tooro King in 2015.
The Tooro Kingdom comprehends the 4 Ugandan districts of 
Kabarole, Kyenjojo, Kamwenge and Kyegegwa. Its palace is 
located in Fort Portal, Kabarole district. Kingdoms were abolished 
in Uganda in 1963, and then re-established in 1993 by Museveni, 
deprived of their executive and judicial powers by the Ugandan 
Constitution of 1995. However, the power and omnipresence 
of the kingdom in the local political scene originates in its still 
high land revenue – many peasants are living on or occupying 
the kingdom’s land. Moreover, the Queen Mother Best Kemigisa 
and her son, the current king, King Oyo, are Museveni’s long-
An electrified fence built by the landlord to prevent “squatters” from cultivating 
a banana field in Kasenda sub-county, Kabarole district.
@G. Schefer
Picture 2:
Picture 1:
time allies. They used this support at various times to go against 
the law and sell off portions of the royal land without any prior 
consultation – e.g., of the Kingdom’s Parliament that represents 
the local clans. In 2010, the sales led to illegal and massive 
expulsions of land occupants, severely harming the Kingdom’s 
popular support. Unpopularity paved the way for an outsider in 
the political field – Prince Kijanangoma, a cousin of the king who 
spent the majority of his life in the US – to launch a political 
movement in 2015, aiming at replacing King Oyo. However, 
Kijanangoma was promptly fooled by the central government 
emissaries. They engaged in negotiations and told him to wait 
until the 2016 election, then will he be satisfied. It did not happen. 
During these few months of political unrest, the young elite 
of activists – notably the organization I worked in – played an 
important role at Kijanangoma’s side. Their network organized 
meetings and radio shows, using personal funds and even 
allegedly11 using donor’s money. 
A map of Uganda, showing the Toro Kingdom @Valérie Golaz
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11 Some interviewee on Kijanangoma’s side made such assertion, but we couldn’t confirm it using evidence.
12 The expression was repeatedly used by members of the group, that is why we are quoting here.
After the start of the negotiations, a big portion of these young 
elites rapidly turned their back on Kijanangoma, and his camp 
split in two. The “elders”, mostly some influential local notables, 
were on Kijanangoma’s side and wanted a negotiated outcome. 
The “youth” on the other hand, led by educated activists, were 
opposing the process. They continued to mobilize the population 
so that the importance of some protests raised the central 
government’s attention. In the end, the movement broke down.
What is the most compelling here is not the story of the event in 
itself, but the local relations of power the incident highlighted. 
The network of young activists and politicians was carrying a 
political project of dismantling the kingdom’s institution, viewed 
as obsolete and irrelevant in its interventions in the conduct of 
public affairs. 
They also regarded it as a major obstacle to their personal career 
ascension, being led by a queen and a king they were enemies 
of. Thus, for the influent members of the group, Kijanangoma – 
besides being fairly illegitimate in Tooro – was not a king to be 
crowned but a “weak man12” to be manipulated and used. They 
wanted to cause an upheaval, overthrow King Oyo, launch a 
popular referendum, then dismantle the Kingdom of Tooro and 
build a more democratic governance in the region. As one of them 
explicitly said on air in 2011, the Ugandan Constitution allows 
a popular referendum on the destitution of the kingdom: “Are 
Kingdoms relevant? Do we really need them to harass us? Are 
there means we can use to avoid such acts from happening? Our 
Constitution answers that: we can reject Kingdoms if they don’t 
suit our culture, desires and aspirations as a community.” 
The Tooro Kingdom events illustrate the power of the local 
human rights actors, carrying an agenda of political re-foundation 
of the community. This historic sequence could have led the 
organization to a more explicit politicisation. But, following the 
event, Kijanangoma and Oyo’s power were tarnished, whereas 
the activist organization maintained its influence. Moreover, it 
partly earned the privileged position of direct interlocutor with 
the local government – replacing the weakened kingdom.
Conclusion
In a hybrid authoritarian context, the production of a highly critical 
discourse and the involvement in the local political field come 
with a cost for a non-profit organization. It requires margins of 
actions and liberties that only strong organizational structures may 
possess. Moreover, the genesis of such “institutions” comes as the 
unintentional result of daily actions the non-profit organization 
implements to secure its margins of action, combined with 
political strategies. An example of it is the 2015 struggle for the 
head of the Tooro Kingdom. In fact, an organization that “makes 
it” internationalizes its funds and deploys rooted local networks 
of “volunteers”, relying on them for influence and autonomy. 
Repression in itself only occurs as ritualized practices and as a 
narrative designed for Western donors, used to underscore the 
risks the activists are supposed to live under. In Museveni’s 
Uganda, the constant link with both international donors and 
the local political personnel could be less an indication than an 
insurance of having secured margins of action. Autonomy, even 
if incomplete, is a result of this long-term work. Actions and 
political discourses – disguised as technical, using the vocabulary 
of the law – of the activists are rendered possible because they 
overcame the status of local individual activists.
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